The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University
: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. The full study is available via SAGE Journals
The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies: Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by
: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power.
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.
Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success